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In 2006, the Carnegie UK Trust launched an Inquiry into the Future of Civil Society 
in the UK and Ireland. 
The Inquiry’s working definition of civil society has three dimensions. Civil society is
understood by the Inquiry as a goal to aim for (a ‘good’ civil society), a means of
achieving it (through civil society associations such as voluntary and community
organisations, trade unions etc.), and a framework for engaging with each other 
about ends and means (arenas for public deliberation). 
To better understand what might be the future threats to and opportunities for civil 
society in the UK and Ireland, looking out to 2025, the Inquiry applied futures thinking.
With support from Henley Centre HeadlightVision, the Inquiry hosted a number of 
futures events across the UK and Ireland, gathering insights from over 400 individuals
with diverse professional and life experiences. 
The purpose of futures work is to ‘disturb the present’ and to help organisations
understand and manage uncertainties and ambiguities. Futures thinking operates on 
an assumption that there is not one future but multiple possible futures, dependent partly
on how we choose to respond to or create change. We can influence the future through
our actions and our choices, even if many dimensions of the future are outside of our
direct control. Exploring the extent to which we can affect change depends on our
understanding of the drivers of change.
There are two reports that summarise the findings of the Inquiry’s futures work. The 
first analyses the drivers of change that are likely to affect the future nature and role 
of civil society, looking out to 2025. Drivers of change are forces (social, technological,
economic, environmental, political, organisational or legal) that may affect civil society, 
for good or for bad. 
This second complementary report describes a number of scenarios that are both
plausible and challenging, illustrating what the future might hold for civil society. 
Scenarios are intended to help people imagine, understand and manage the future more
effectively. They are not intended to be forecasts of what will happen. Instead they seek 
to identify what could happen in the longer term if there are changes in values, attitudes,
social and economic structures, or in science and technology. The primary reason for
developing scenarios is to improve one’s understanding of the overall external
environment, and to improve one’s responsiveness and adaptiveness to change.
In order to ‘disturb the present’, one aim of the Inquiry futures reports, is to encourage
civil society associations to interact and engage with the scenarios. A tool-kit and guide
on how to use these scenarios is available as an online resource to accompany this report
(www.carnegieuktrust.org.uk) . 
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Drawing on the findings of the Inquiry workshops, four scenarios illustrating possible
futures for civil society in 2025 were developed, summarised below:
• Local Life: Resource scarcity and energy costs lead to the regeneration of local life.
Civil society has been in the vanguard of this process, and as a result has gained
significant political influence. But there is insularity and competition between localities.
• Athenian Voices (Electronic Age): Technology and innovation leads to far greater
involvement and engagement in politics, and in more inclusive debate. But technology
can also facilitate and encourage atomisation; it indulges individualism and can
transform media from a ‘broadcast’ to a ‘narrowcast’ paradigm.
• Diversity Wars: Cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity – along with social divisions
arising from inequalities of income and environmental impacts – has led to conflicts
between and within communities over resources and values. But younger generations
have more in common – and large scale environmental problems require co-operation
to be managed. 
• Global Compact: The security state constructed for the ‘war on terror’ is no longer
regarded as effective. Civil society associations have led the campaign against the
exploitation inherent in cheap goods and together with global agencies play a key role
in monitoring labour practices. But migrant labour, which is increasingly needed in
Europe, is a different story. States oscillate between local populism and a global view. 
There are a number of implications which emerge overall for the future of civil society.
Since it is one of the intentions of this report to help civil society use futures thinking to
improve its own planning and decision making, we have framed these as a series of
questions that can be applied to this particular scenario set.
• How does civil society respond to the emerging conflict between conventional
economics and environmental and resource issues?
• How does civil society help to support the spaces (physical and otherwise) where
differences can be explored and reconciled about future values, social needs and
problem solving?
• How do civil society associations prevent themselves and indeed society from
fragmenting along socio-economic, ethnic and/or religious lines? 
• How does civil society connect to representative politics at all levels – from the global
to the national to the local?
• How does civil society respond to shifting notions of the workplace, more international
supply chains, and to the increasing levels of economic migration which appear likely?
• How does civil society influence the development of technology so it supports the
development of a ‘good society’ rather than undermines it?
• What are the future problems which can only be addressed by civil society and its
organisations – and what is the nature of these problems which make this true?  
Executive summary
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Implications arising from the scenarios
The Scenarios
In 2006, the Carnegie UK Trust launched an Inquiry into the Future of Civil Society in the 
UK and Ireland. Informed by an Inquiry Commission, chaired by Geoff Mulgan, and an
International Advisory Group, the goals of the Inquiry are to:
• Explore the possible threats to and opportunities for the development of a healthy civil
society, looking out to 2025
• Identify how policy and practice can be enhanced to help strengthen civil society
• Enhance the ability of civil society associations to prepare for the challenges of the future.
Given the vast scale and scope of civil society, the Inquiry has split its work into two phases. 
The purpose of the first phase of the Inquiry was to identify and explore possible future
threats to and opportunities for the development of a healthy civil society, looking out 
to 2025. To help achieve this goal, the Carnegie UK Trust commissioned Henley Centre
HeadlightVision (HCHLV), an organisation with experience of applying futures thinking. 
Using futures techniques, HCHLV and the Carnegie UK Trust: 
• Undertook research to identify the key drivers of change that are likely to affect civil
society (this primarily involved drawing on HCHLV’s extensive database of social,
technological, economic, environmental and political drivers for change). 
• Held a series of futures workshops across the UK and Ireland for the purpose of
gathering insights about what the future might hold. Around 400 people with diverse
professional and life experiences participated in these events. Individual reports from
each of the Inquiry events are available on the Inquiry website.
• Conducted semi-structured interviews with key informants. 
There are two reports that summarise the findings of the first phase of the Inquiry’s work.
The first report outlines the analysis of the drivers of change that are likely to affect the
future nature and role of civil society, looking out to 2025. This second complementary
report describes a number of scenarios that are both plausible and challenging, illustrating
what the future might hold for civil society. 
Both reports are designed not only to inform the second and final stage of the Inquiry’s work,
but to stimulate further deliberation about the future of civil society in the UK and Ireland. 
Drawing on the findings of the first phase of the Inquiry, the Inquiry Commission will 
identify a number of ‘burning issues’ to explore in further depth in 2008. The second 
phase of the Inquiry will draw back to the present and identify how policy and practice
might be enhanced in the near-term so as to better take advantage of emerging
opportunities or diminish possible threats for civil society. 
Scenarios for civil society
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Introduction
Phase one of the Inquiry 
What next? Phase two of the Inquiry 
Civil society is clearly a contested concept. For the purpose of the Inquiry, the working
definition of civil society draws on the work of Michael Edwards2 and has the following
three dimensions: 
Civil Society as associational life. Civil society is the ‘space’ of organised activity not
undertaken by either the government or for-private-profit business. It includes formal and
informal associations such as: voluntary and community organisations, trade unions,
faith-based organisations, co-operatives and mutuals, political parties, professional and
business associations, philanthropic organisations, informal citizen groups and social
movements. Participation in or membership of such organisations is voluntary in nature.
Civil Society as the ‘good’ society. The term civil society is often used as a short-hand
for the type of society we want to live in and can therefore be viewed in normative terms.
It is often assumed that civil society is a good thing, but this is not necessarily true. For
example, civil society associations can help strengthen democracy and improve the 
well-being of deprived communities as can they undermine human rights and preach
intolerance and violence. The Inquiry is therefore especially concerned about the strength
of civil society associations as a means through which values and outcomes such as 
non-violence, non-discrimination, democracy, mutuality and social justice are nurtured
and achieved; and as a means through which public policy dilemmas are resolved in 
ways that are just, effective and democratic. The actions of civil society associations 
alone cannot achieve a ’good’ civil society. A ‘good’ civil society is dependent on the
outcomes of and relationships between government, statutory agencies, the business
sector and media.
Civil Society as arenas for public deliberation. Civil society is the ‘space’ in which
societal differences, social problems, public policy, government action and matters of
community and cultural identity are developed and debated. These public spaces might be
physical in nature, such as community centres or conference facilities, or virtual, such as
blogs. We may never share a common vision about what a ‘good’ society might look like
and how it might be achieved, but we can be committed to a process that allows people
of all ages and backgrounds to share in defining how the different visions are reconciled.
To summarise, civil society is a goal to aim for (a 'good' society), a means to achieve it
(associational life), and a framework for engaging with each other about ends and means
(arenas for deliberation).
What is civil society?
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What is civil society?
The scenario building process drew on the analysis of how drivers of change are likely 
to impact the future of civil society, looking out to 2025. The full details of this work
summarised below, can be found in the complementary report ‘The shape of civil society 
to come’ (see www.carnegieuktrust.org.uk). 
Drivers of change are forces (social, technological, economic, environmental, political or
organisational), that may affect civil society in the future for good or bad. Participants in
the Inquiry events held around the UK and Ireland prioritised around 20 drivers of change
(listed in Table 1) that are most likely to affect civil society.
Table 1: Important drivers of change
Using an impact matrix, Henley Centre HeadlightVision analysed the drivers of change
outlined in Table 1 and organised them accordingly in to three categories (illustrated in
Figure 1). The first category represents contexts. These are important but largely certain
drivers over which civil society associations have little influence, such as aging population
and increasing migration (yet civil society associations will need to respond to them). The
second category is those drivers of change which present the greatest uncertainties for
civil society. 
Scanning, understanding and
interpreting the drivers of change
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The uncertain drivers of change are variable, and can therefore be influenced by the
actions of civil society associations. These important drivers of change have been
clustered into the following headings: 
• Limits of economics (such as growing socio-economic divides and pressure 
on global resources)
• Personal values (such as rising individualism and shifting identities)
• Shifting activism (such as disengagement with formal politics and the rise of 
‘digital natives’)
• State and individual (such as the visibility of the security state and the regulation 
of civil life)
The third and final category of drivers of change are those which represent outcomes 
of some of the contextual and/or uncertain drivers (such as the increasing complexity 
of family structures and the ‘professionalisation’ of Third sector organisations).
Figure 1: Schematic of prioritised driver
Source: Henley Centre HeadlightVision.
The detail is explored more fully in the complementary report that explores the drivers of
change (The shape of civil society to come), but for the purposes of this scenarios report
it will be seen immediately that each cluster of uncertain drivers has conflicts within them
and there are also conflicts between each cluster. The Limits of Economics is about
the challenge to conventional notions of economic growth, and economic power, which 
is created by the emergence of climate change politics and resource shortages. Within
Personal Values, there is a similar clash between individualism and well-being, but also
between different diversities. Shifting Activism is defined by the use of technology
around single issue politics, which in turn runs the risk of increasing further the
disengagement from formal politics. While within the State and the Individual, the
security state has a fundamental conflict, at least in the way that it is currently interpreted,
with the importance of the human rights agenda.
7
Contexts:
• Falling cost of 
technologies
• Increasing migration
• Shift from uni-polar 
world to multi-polar 
world     
• Ageing population
• Scientific consensus 
on climate change







• From media 
consumption to 
production
• Growth of the 
surveillance state









• Pressure on global resources
• Response to climate change




• Cultural and religious diversity





• Disengagement from 
formal politics
• Single issue politics
• Pervasive technology
• Rise of digital natives 
State and 
individual
• Visibility of security state
• Regulation of civic life
• Increasing importance 
of rights agenda
Scanning, understanding and interpreting the drivers of change
Scenarios, of course, are not predictions, although they can be considered as
projections. They are not intended to be forecasts of what will happen. Instead they 
seek to identify what could happen in the longer term if there are changes in values,
attitudes, social and economic structures, or in science and technology. Signs of such
changes are typically observable today, although they are not always easy to quantify. 
Also, scenarios are not visions of what we want to happen; we may not like some of the
possible future worlds which emerge from a scenario development process. The reason
for developing scenarios is to improve one’s understanding of the overall external
environment, and to improve one’s responsiveness and adaptiveness to change.  
Scenarios have to be plausible and coherent views of the future, and they need to be 
able to explain the journey from the present to the imagined future world of the scenario.
At the same time, though, they have permission to be creatures of the imagination, to
take some risks with ‘what might be’. This is what enables them to be used to explore 
the future and to help think about ambiguity and uncertainty.  
As a recent report puts it, 
“Futures work is just another strategic tool. It won’t tell you what’s going to happen 
in twenty years time or even five, but it will show you a picture of a world that could
plausibly happen, and challenge you to think about what that would mean, whether 
it should be welcomed or how it might be avoided.” 3
It should be underlined that one of the reasons for having a conversation about the 
future is to understand the present both better and differently.
As Peter Schwarz of the Global Business Network has argued, 
“The test of good scenarios is not getting the future right... The real test of a good
scenario is: did I make better choices as a result of having looked at and understood 
both my own environment better and the consequences of my actions?” 4
As values are so important in understanding the future of civil society, to develop the
scenarios we chose not to use a conventional inductive scenarios process. One of the
reasons for this is that such approaches tend to treat values as a given. Instead, we used
a scenarios process known as ‘Causal Layered Analysis’, which explores possible futures
as being constructed from multiple layers; from ‘litany’, to ‘systems’, to ‘worldview’, to
‘metaphor’. No one layer is privileged in the understanding of the future (see Appendix 1
for further information about the methodology). The scenarios are built up deductively
through the uncertainties generated by the re-framing of current prevailing ‘worldviews’.
(For example, if a current ‘worldview‘ is that ‘A few voices are privileged’, then an
alternative worldview might be that ‘All voices are privileged’). 
Drawing on the material developed in the Inquiry workshops, the following four scenarios
have been developed to illustrate what the future might hold for civil society, looking out 
to 2025. 
Developing and using scenarios
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9The scenarios
For almost two decades now there has been increased global competition for energy,
against a background of squeezed supplies. Prices have risen steadily, and kept on rising:
the easy assumptions of the late 20th century about cheap personal transport and long-
distance distribution networks are long gone. 
There have been economic pressures as a result. Disposable income has fallen, and there
is less variety in the shops. But there has been at least one significant benefit, because
the cost of energy has made people use it far more carefully. There has, at last, been
sizeable investment in renewables, often locally sourced and managed. Carbon emissions
have started to fall as a result, if not as fast as campaigners and some climate change
scientists would like to see.
The immediate effect of the energy crunch was that people spent more time than before
in their local communities, and for many this was, at first, an unfamiliar experience. In
some places, effective local organisations already existed. In others, they had to be
rebuilt. The greater social contact of being around one’s home more usually helped. 
If energy was the catalyst for change, there were other strong trends which reinforced 
the new more local living. One was well-being; research showed that people who are 
more engaged with local social networks are less likely to suffer from stress or depression.
Another trend was the concern over the quality and provenance of food, as well as
campaigns to support local economies through local procurement. People also found
through experience that effective shifts towards sustainability (or ‘durability’ as it is usually
called these days) only worked if they had local support. And the ‘new allotments
movement’ has boomed. 
The scenarios
Local life
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While some have suggested that this has largely been a middle class phenomenon, 
some poorer communities have been startlingly successful in using local skills to improve
local infrastructures, using NGO support to tap in to the central funds which are available
to improve local public spaces. At the same time, it is also true that the most spectacular
failures have been in some of the poorest inner city areas. The critical difference between
success and failure in this world seems to be the quality and availability of local resources,
especially leadership and energy supplies. 
One consequence has been the decentralisation of politics, along with more local
budgeting. Local turn-outs have increased, while national voting figures continue to
decline partly because local representatives are so much more accountable. The Swiss
canton model has become the most studied in Europe. There are multiple centres of
power within the EU, even if localism sometimes seems to tip over into parochialism. 
Technology has meant that the economic impact of greater localism was not as sharp 
as it might have been 50 years earlier. Some still work for companies based outside of
their areas, but faster computers and more bandwidth means that they are likely to spend
more time either working from home or in local shared office hubs. People don’t talk any
longer about flexible working, but about the ‘extended workplace’, a phenomenon which
went rather wider than traditional white-collar work. The ‘plant on the chip’ also means
that manufacturing assembly tends to be done closer to home as well; the manufacturer
sends the digital assembly instructions, not the finished goods.
One social outcome is greater intergenerational engagement, if only because people 
of working age are more likely to be around than they used to be, and this has led in 
turn to greater engagement by young people. The YPFs (Young People’s Forums) have 
a recognised role in many local budgeting processes. 
One of the biggest issues has been the increases in care needed by an ageing
population. Here, resources have tended to go to national organisations which can offer
economies of scale, and even though delivery is local, there are tensions here. One 
of the marks of a successful community is the extent to which it is able to attract and
retain younger people from outside to contribute to its local economy.        
At the same time, local communities are not always good at tolerating strangers – or 
the strange. People who don’t fit in are often marginalised or excluded. Sometimes they
have to move on. In richer areas, exclusion is sometimes more formal; some upmarket
developers specialise in large scale self-contained gated communities, with the 
full panoply of surveillance and security. Beyond the merely wealthy, in a world in 
which inequalities are still persistent, can be found a highly mobile global class of the 
hyper-rich who are largely disconnected from these local worlds.
Some regret the loss of the easy globalism which cheap travel afforded. Online
connections have mitigated some of this, with virtual connections between communities
with shared interests. A Rural Forum, for example, connects rural communities with
similar problems in the Highlands and Islands, the West of Ireland, Brittany, and
Catalunya. There is travel, but speed is only for the rich. When people do travel, they 
tend to travel more slowly and stay longer when they get there. It can lead to deeper
understanding and longer-lasting relationships than tourism used to.    




The landscape of this scenario (Local life)
The dimensions are a way of describing each scenario across a range of common
characteristics. Their purpose is to enable a more straightforward comparison of the different
scenarios, and also to make it easier to connect the scenarios to a strategy or planning process. 
Types of organisations
The table below illustrates the nature and role of diverse organisations found in this scenario.
Local associations • These thrive. Existing organisations gain in influence, and new ones emerge.
Faith based groups • Tend to be more effective when they operate under an effective 
‘inter-faith’ umbrella. Influential in setting local values around tolerance
of difference and so on. 
Advocacy
organisations
• Tend to articulate needs of the local world to national government and to
the EU; and help less advantaged communities access national support
and funding.
Workplace based • As the ‘extended workplace’ becomes more virtual, so do trade unions.
Sometimes taking the form of support networks for relatively isolated workers.  
Political parties • Are most effective when they act as a bridge from the local to the
national (and not the other way around).
Service
organisations
• Extensive co-creation of services with local partners, although budget
pressures mean they tend still to be national organisations. A source of tension. 
Focus of economic
activity
• Balance has shifted to more local economic bases, with shorter supply
chains and more being produced and bought locally.
Politics: centre 
of gravity
• The political focus has shifted to a more local level, with greater local
control of budgets. There is tension between the EU, national government
and local communities.
Diversity • Diversity plays out differently in different communities, depending on
their cultural history, prevailing social attitudes, and the values of the
organisations which provide leadership in a given locality. 
Technology use • Computer technologies and distribution networks have substituted for
transport use to a significant extent. Infrastructure technologies (such 
as energy) tend to be more distributed (less centralised).
Resource agenda • Resource reduction is managed principally at a local level. Central funds
can be bid for to support investment projects which help to achieve this.
Ethical agenda • Sourcing and provenance are important. Greater importance is attached
to ‘paying fairly for goods’.
Security • International conflicts are most likely to be about resources – energy, water,
food. The transition to more local economics reduces this – but isn’t fast
enough. Security is regarded as an EU responsibility, not a national concern.  
Alliances • Building links within communities is valuable (e.g. interfaith groups).
Connections which increase access to central funding are also needed. 
Sources of
conflicts
• Conflicts between communities are more significant than conflicts 
within them. 
Expertise • Community building skills, social development skills, as well as 
traditional craft and gardening skills, are all valued.
There aren’t many places outside of a laboratory where one can talk literally of exponential
growth, but the world of technology continues to be one. The prediction contained in
Moore’s ‘Law’ that the cost of processing power would halve every eighteen months, has
broadly held good. The sums have to be done to be believed; by 2025, computing devices
are about 4,000 times as powerful as they had been in 2007, for the same sort of price. Of
course video and audio are commonplace, and pocket devices ubiquitous. But this is also 
a world in which a desk top computer can reconstruct a football match, live and in real 
time, from sensor data inside the stadium, and display it on screen in high resolution. At
these prices, anything which can usefully have a chip in it already has. Information is
instantaneous and mobile, while the real and the virtual exist simultaneously everywhere. 
At the same time, though, there are increasing shortages of bandwidth, and experts warn
constantly of the dangers of system collapse, and even sabotage.  
Because of the amount of processing power, the technology is far friendlier than it was in
2007. It is tactile and immersive, emotional and affective. If we still have virtual identities
(avatars), they seem awfully like our actual selves, at least when we’re in public rather than
playing a game. Virtual work groups are surprisingly effective at getting work done, since 
the technology can deal with nuance of meaning, and even with irony. 
Digital exclusion no longer exists, for everyone has entitlement to some technology capacity
as part of their identity certification requirements. There are debates everywhere, often with
high levels of engagement, but they are too often about single issues and lack cohesion 
and connection, fizzling out as quickly as they flare up. “Tales told by idiots”, as a sardonic
commentator wrote recently “and signifying nothing”. It isn’t always thus. In some places,
where the political culture is stronger and more accountable, and the education system
better at conveying the importance of citizenship, the world of online discussion does feed
in to the public decision process. 
Athenian Voices (Electronic Age)
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The scenarios
But the world of Athenian Voices is full of such tensions, a fine line between virtual
posturing and state control on the one hand, and public engagement on the other.
For example, many of the networks are owned by commercial organisations, and few 
of them are based in Britain or Ireland. There are constant jurisdictional disputes about
whose law applies where. At the same time, the issue of trust is critical, and few of the
commercial organisations are trusted. The universities have started to re-emerge as
centres of trusted information and public learning, after being shamed by the radical 
Open University movement of younger lecturers and researchers. Libraries have become
significant local public spaces. And the BBC, now a non-profit organisation mutually
owned by its users, is also well-trusted.
But too much of the virtual life remains individual in its nature. Organisations which once
offered cohesion have mostly continued to wither. The notion of ‘belonging’ to a political
party has become quaint, and trade unions have continued to decline in importance and
influence. Civil society organisations tend to concentrate on single issues, some are even
‘mayfly’ organisations, flowering for a moment and then melting into air. In contrast, faith
groups are among the few civil society organisations that do encourage their members to
think across a multitude of issues. Faith is flourishing – and faith based organisations are
one of the few organisations left that resemble civil society past – built on volunteers and 
a strong criticism of individualism. Their volunteers are committed, and there is talk of the
establishment of a multi faith political party. 
Many of the experiments in new forms of political participation have not been successful,
because they didn’t help people think about the issue in a wider context. E-referenda are
now largely discredited. In their place, more ‘deliberative’ methods, which help people
explore the implications of a policy decision, have been more effective.    
One of the biggest divides remains an inter-generational one. The so-called ‘digital natives’,
who grew up immersed in technology, are now in their mid-40s, and represent about half
of the population. For them, this world is a completely familiar place. Their response to any
problem seems to be to ‘build a software widget’. And even where the political discourse
seems thin, there is often a rich and creative cultural life mediated through technology. The
Creative Commons,5 once narrowly concerned with issues of copyright, is now a broadly
based campaign about access and ownership. 
The vulnerability of the system was made only too clear in the Great Outage of 2021,
which shut down large parts of the network for days, and corrupted data in other places.
Even now, after a long police investigation and a judicial report, it’s still not clear if it was 
a malicious attack by cyber-criminals or a technical failure caused by system overload.
Whatever the cause, the outcome was striking. People reappeared on the streets and in
public spaces. One of the unexpected outcomes was the emergence of the New Realist
Movement, a campaign for ‘real people and real politics’ which was a tangible backlash 
to a world which they said had become overly dependent on the virtual. And today their
supporters can be seen, all over the country, gathering every morning in public spaces 
for their morning Tai Chi sessions…  
Local associations • Likely to be relatively effective, given that much online and virtual use
reside around existing social networks which are also likely to meet
physically as well.
Faith based groups • Emerge as sources of cohesive values with effective memberships. 




• Tend to single-issue, mostly short-lived, and often ineffective in
connecting their agendas with representative politics. 
Workplace based • Have tended to wither as union membership has disappeared. Some
employer-based activity, much of it anonymous and oppositional.
Political parties • In general have diminished further, turning into temporary coalitions 
of single issue groups.  
Service
organisations
• Increasingly services are delivered remotely wherever possible using
individual’s universal identification code. Technology also used for
prevention-based monitoring.
The landscape of this scenario (Athenian voices)
Types of organisations




• Increasing focus on knowledge-led and service businesses.
Politics: centre of
gravity
• Point of tension as to whether representative political processes are
connected to the virtual world, or whether they are disconnected.
Diversity • Likely to see emergence of virtual online ‘clusters’ around the interests of
particular diversity groups; unlikely to see coalitions of interests emerge.
Technology use • Ubiquitous and rich, but with some backlash against the level of
importance it has in everyday life.
Resource agenda • Computing power likely to outstrip the ability of networks to support it.
May be issues around amount of power used by virtual world, and by
technology components.
Ethical agenda • Fragmented; different campaigns will underline different ethical issues,
but are unlikely to build coherent set of values around them.
Security • Focus on security of the networks.
Alliances • Few, since this is a fragmented world. In the physical world, inter-faith




• Conflicts over trust, ownership of networks and critical technologies, 
and the use of technology for surveillance or monitoring purposes.




The long process of fragmentation of many European societies (and that of the United
States) has continued, and in some ways become more acute, since 2007. Part of the
story is economic: the inequalities and increased polarisation of the rich at one end of the
wealth spectrum, and the workless poor at the other, a trend which dates back to the
1980s, has continued to grow. It has been exacerbated by a lack of social mobility. 
A second layer is about ethnic difference and migration, much of it to fill labour shortages
in an ageing society or – more temporarily – to do work which local workers are no longer
willing to do. 
And a third layer of difference is about faith, and competing religions. In a world where
there is increasing competition for resources, global conflicts often find themselves echoed
on the backstreets of Europe’s cities.
That’s the story on the surface, at least. But underneath, something slightly different is
going on. There is an inter-generational divide as well – the younger generations, mostly
brought up in schools where multiple languages are spoken, and different religious
holidays are shared, are finding that they have more in common than separates them. 
And civil society associations have started to find new forms of dialogue and discourse
which are designed to rebuild shared values within and across communities. As the
resource crisis starts to bite, people have started to realise that if they don’t hang together,
they’ll hang separately. 
Diversity Wars
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Governments have played their own part in this, not least because they’ve weakened
commitment to the idea of the nation by pursuing economic agendas which seemed to
benefit corporations rather than their citizens, and promoted international policies which
only sometimes seem to be in the interests of all of their citizens. Initially, citizens believed
the rhetoric of governments that there is little that nation-states can do, and they turned
inwards into their own communities and their own traditional cultures. 
One outcome of this environment of mistrust has been high levels of citizen surveillance.
The identity card scheme initially abandoned by the government more than fifteen years
before was resurrected, this time successfully, in 2016 and has become a part of
everyday life. Anyone not carrying their card is immediately under suspicion. The remote
control helicopters or ‘spy drones’ are a common site in Irish skies. Right wing groups
also gained momentum; older radicals were reminded of the politics of the late 70s.
But as more sophisticated responses emerged – in part from civil society organisations
finding new language to challenge the prevailing discourse – governments found themselves 
having to change tack. A surprising bestseller in 2017 was the populist economic book, 
The death of globalisation, written by a young charismatic Anglo-Indian academic. 
Her argument was simple enough: that communities and individuals were being blamed
and even scapegoated – by the media and by politicians – but the problem was that the
market had become too powerful, and that governments had failed (individually and
collectively) to curb corporate market power. Economic greed was short-sighted because
it created more losers than winners – and that the losers, eventually, realised that they
had more in common with each other. 
In the vacuum, two groups have emerged with some sense of identity; on the one hand,
cultures with a sense of separateness, such as Scotland, or Ireland, or Brittany; on the
other migrants have clung to ethno-nationalism to provide a sense of belonging. In all of
these, language, history and performance are increasingly important. Due to migration in
many countries more ‘non-natives’ are being born than ‘natives’, which has significantly
challenged national identities and notions of ‘inclusion’. Although such demographic 
data has played into populist (and racist) political agendas, and has been amplified by
newspapers in a desperate spiral of decline and circulation competition, civil society
organisations have managed to build alternative meanings around cultural richness and
the re-energising of an ageing workforce. In this they are building on a story which is
already visible. Popular culture – especially the music scene – in Britain and Ireland
continues to be the envy of much of Europe because of its innovation and richness. 
One outcome has been a renewed focus on building and strengthening an independent
media, led by civil society associations, with support from philanthropists. 
Some say that this world is, in effect, a fight between the last throes of the values of the
late 20th century, and those of the different world of the 21st. Thatcher’s children are 
in their late 50s now, while those who benefited from the Celtic Tiger are only a little
younger. Others point to a new cultural politics of the younger generation as a pre-cursor
of new types of representation. And even others take comfort from some of the emerging
business leaders who have declined their bonuses – or given them away. Something is
happening – even if we don’t yet know what it is. 








• The current ‘globalisation’ economic agenda comes under attack 
during the life of the scenario, as does the heavy levels of debt on 
which consumer culture is built.
Politics: centre of
gravity
• Vacuum between nation state and local communities, filled in places 
by development of regional or ethnic identities. 
Diversity • Conflicts about diversity play out in different ways: destructively at 
an ethnic and economic level initially, but inter-generational conflict
is potentially a force for positive change.
Technology use • Technology is not a significant feature of the scenario, except in that 
it is used for surveillance.
Resource agenda • Emerging agenda about reducing resource use generally driven by
younger generation as part of a market critique.
Ethical agenda • Emerging ethical agenda is about not scapegoating individuals or
communities for the problems created by corporations and
‘globalisation’.
Security • Security used initially as part of a public management tool by
governments, reinforced by internal surveillance.
Alliances • Regional activists, cultural activists, and anti-market economists 
share a common critique but from widely varying perspectives
Sources of
conflicts
• Significant conflicts between corporate agenda and that of 
communities. Governments have to choose which side to join
Local associations • Pressure to act as mediators/bridge-builders. Over time those that 
can develop new discourses frame emerging agendas. Cultural
organisations important.
Faith based groups • Faith-based organisations communicate well at a ‘high’ level but weak
connections at a local level. Locally, different faiths have to re-learn tolerance. 
Advocacy
organisations
• Important to the transition of the scenario, by building new language 
and critiques of prevailing society. May find allies in faith and workplace
organisations. 
Workplace based • Trade unions which are not squeezed by employers are likely to be
influential in building critique of the effect of market economics on
individuals. 
Political parties • Rise of ‘extremist’ parties that only respect values of equality etc. for
their own ‘kind’.
Foundations • Supporting independent media/charities mediating or brokering
relationships between diverse groups.
Service
organisations
• Initially likely to fragment into provision for specific communities (Red Crescent
and Red Cross). Later may be rebuilt at regional level, where this is effective.
The attempts to make the world more secure by pursuing military and criminal solutions
have long since been regarded as a failure. In their place, there have emerged new
approaches which have turned out to be much more successful in reducing the level of
terrorism and insecurity. It seems a long way away from the ‘war on terror’ which was
promoted so assidiously by the United States and the United Kingdom in the first part 
of the century, but it turned out to be more successful. One of the unexpected effects 
has been that smaller nations, with little or no history of empire, have become influential
beyond their scale. The new brokers in the sustainable security agenda have been countries
such as Norway, Ireland, and Poland whose histories and long-standing diasporas make
them better at dealing with multi-national and multi-cultural conflict. They are additionally
trusted by most, and especially by those with less power in global negotiations.
How has this come about? A host of different trends converged to create a shift in
international values. The first was the unsustainable cost of the security agenda, as
resources spent on security squeezed out other public investment. The effect of the
‘terror’ rhetoric by politicians diminished through repetition. And there were other
significant shifts as well. Judiciaries across Europe – and some in the United States –
repeatedly threw out terror cases because they breached human rights law. 
Civil society organisations have also been influential in spurring a shift towards social
values underpinned by social justice. The faith groups and trade union activists who
campaigned to promote fair trade in the 1990s continued their work on the link between
consumerism, especially of cheap goods, and labour abuses worldwide. The ‘cheap isn’t
cheerful’ campaign named companies which were linked to unethical practices – a
campaign which gained support from City pension funds, where managers had learnt 
that poor labour practices by companies tended to be an indicator of short-termist
management whose share price was likely to under-perform, often quite soon. 
Scenarios for civil society
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The scenarios
International labour regulations have been beefed up under the auspices of the United
Nations. The regulation now has teeth, unlike earlier International Labour Organisation
(ILO) provisions, and the trade unions and faith based groups act as monitors of labour
standards across the globe. A role they are uniquely placed to fulfil given their closeness
to working people globally.
Companies also learnt that they got what they paid for from the suppliers. It only took 
so many expensive, time-consuming and reputation-damaging product recalls before
they put more investment into making sure that they were getting the quality of
manufacturing they needed. Even if it increased their production costs, they recouped 
it elsewhere in the business. 
And this trend was intensified by those consumers – a minority, admittedly, and typically more
affluent – whose buying habits moved towards owning fewer goods but of higher quality.
Diaspora communities also played their part in this social shift. They had long adopted 
the concept that one should ‘think local, act global’. One of the interesting observations
about the response to climate change was that it was most successful where it engaged
people in their local communities, and diaspora groups reinforced this by creating new
connections between their historic and cultural communities, most now clearly affected
by climate change outcomes, and their homes in the affluent countries of the north. This
raised funds for mitigation in the south even as it increased awareness of the importance
of effective action to reduce carbon emissions in the north.
If this sounds too good to be true, it is. There are still conflicts in this world. Goods have
become more expensive, both because of increased wages to producers, and because
of increased resource and energy costs, and this has caused conflict even though overall
incomes across Europe continue to rise. For some consumers the habits of the 1980s
and 1990s die hard; there’s always someone on a TV news vox pop, even now, talking
about ‘retail therapy’ and their ‘right to go shopping’. Although the focus on ethical
business and ethical retailing has put pressure on firms to service poorer areas more
effectively, poorer communities tend to feel the pinch.
And in a world where the affluent world is ageing, economic migrants were
commonplace. Those with skills were welcomed openly, but many others (fruit pickers
and other seasonal workers, for example) had become a class of nomadic employees,
following the work and moving on, suffering low wages and lacking basic rights.
Where inequality was sharpest, or where local communities were poorest, conflicts 
would break out. Some welcomed the election of an Islamic party MP in East London 
as a sign that minority groups were becoming engaged in the political process. Others
saw it as an indication of a new separatism. And there are always politicians, and others,
who are happy to stir-up such conflicts.
Nonetheless, if there are still recurrent local conflicts, this is a world with a different
international agenda. The global institutions which matter now are no longer those like 
the World Trade Organisation which engender conflict and increased inequality. Instead,
global organisations are increasingly similar to types of porous and consensual models
familiar, for example, to the Irish through their social partnership structures. Sure enough,
they could be frustratingly slow sometimes, but that was a price that people were
prepared to pay. A world where security was achieved through concentrating on social
justice felt a lot safer.  
The landscape of this scenario (Global compact)




• Global economy with global trade. Increased focus on ‘fairness’ in value
chain – because businesses fear repercussions for quality, reputation,
and access to investment.
Politics: centre of
gravity
• Shift towards negotiation through international frameworks – often slow
and consensual. Influenced by local campaigns and action (on the
‘Survival’ or ‘Amnesty’ models).
Diversity • Remains a source of recurring conflict, partly for economic reasons.
Exacerbated by use of temporary migrant workers to do seasonal or
short-term work.
Technology use • Local and national civil society organisations – and their members – 
use technology to connect together campaigns which have an
international effect.
Resource agenda • Continuing economic development has meant that energy costs have
risen and resource use has been squeezed. Individual behaviour has
started to change as a result – towards buying less.
Ethical agenda • The ethics of international trade and the long-distance supply chain are
increasingly visible and increasingly scrutinised. But ethical impacts
closer to home are sometimes overlooked.
Security • The security agenda has moved to ‘sustainable security’ – that only by
reducing the underlying sources of conflict, wherever possible, is it
possible to increase safety.
Alliances • Connections between faith groups and unions to campaign against unfair
trading practices; local/global connections organised by diaspora groups;




• Conflicts between the poorest – often along ethnic lines. Conflicts
between those who are still attached to a consumerist ethic and object 
to attempts by regulators or activist campaigns to impose limits on this.
Expertise which is
valued
• International perspective and understanding, ability to build relationships





Local associations • Act as a bridge between local needs and wider international agendas. 
Re-frame global issues into language and action which is relevant and
meaningful at a local level.
Faith based groups • Strongly connected with diaspora relationships and issues.
Advocacy
organisations
• Operating in a receptive environment. The most effective have built
bridges with the global organisations which police agreements – and
understand rights law.
Workplace based • Trade unions articulate a rights-based and ethics-based approach to
employment. Work closely with fair trade and human rights advocacy
groups to monitor and report on labour abuses worldwide.
Political parties • The decline of influence of the national political party continues. Where
parties are effective, it is at a local level – or a European level.
Service
organisations
• In many ways similar to the world of 2007. But like all organisations 
in this world they are closely scrutinised for their terms of service and
have to be more transparent and accountable than in 2007.
Reviewing the scenarios as a whole, there are a number of implications which emerge for
the future of civil society. Since it is one of the intentions of this report to help civil society
associations use futures thinking to improve planning and decision making, we have
framed these as a series of questions, together with some supporting argument. Clearly
the following set of questions is not exhaustive. 
How does civil society respond to the emerging conflict between conventional
economics, environmental and resource issues?
The period to 2025 is most likely to be characterised – at a global level – by continuing
pressure to reduce carbon emissions, and pressure on some natural resources, in
particular fossil-based energy, water and some raw materials. Population will continue 
to increase, with consequences for food supplies. At the same time, however, action 
to mitigate these will conflict with the current dominant models of economic growth,
regulation and competition, and related trends such as consumerism.
At the same time, there are signs of new agendas emerging around economics, 
ranging from accounting for the full costs of resources in the production process to 
the importance of social well being as a measure to counter the sole reliance on
economic growth as an indicator of success.
Responses so far from civil society organisations have ranged across the spectrum 
from the collaborative to the confrontational; to the use of judicial and other institutional
processes to get governments to abide by agreements; to examples of alternative
practice; to advocacy, and so on.
How does civil society help to support the spaces (physical and otherwise)
where differences can be explored and reconciled about future values, social
needs and problem solving?
The pressures identified above will create a need for social transitions in which there are
likely to be both winners and losers. This suggests that negotiation between different
groups about the sort of future we are likely to have, the sort of future we might want 
to choose, and how to get there.
This means that there will need to be public arenas – both actual physical spaces and
virtual electronic spaces – in which different people and different communities will need 
to meet. Civil society will need to act to connect these groups, to support and maintain
the spaces in which they can meet, and to help shape their conversations so that they
are constructive rather than destructive.
One particular area where civil society is currently particularly weak is in the traditional
media; a key challenge for civil society associations may be to ensure that the market 
and the State do not dominate the new media formats as they do the old.
Implications arising from the scenarios
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Implications arising from the scenarios
How do civil society associations prevent themselves and society in general
from fragmenting further along socio-economic, ethnic and/or religious lines? 
A recurring theme throughout the findings of the Inquiry’s futures work relates to concerns
that civil society associations and society itself will become more fragmented. A key
challenge for civil society associations is therefore to connect and bridge communities 
or organisations. Also, civil society associations will need to consider whether their own
organisational and governance models help avoid fragmentation. 
How does civil society connect to representative politics at all levels – from 
the global to the national to the local?
A recurring theme of the Inquiry scenarios workshops was that civil society associations
were good at talking to each other but not generally so good at talking to representative
political bodies, whether at local, regional, national or international level. Yet civil society
associations are not able to achieve their goals on their own. These goals also need to 
be articulated by representative political parties. Civil society associations can benefit 
from political parties which are able to create high levels of engagement.
How does civil society construct a relationship with representative political institutions,
while not at the same time diminishing its role as a source both of independent critique 
of government, or of social innovation?  
How does civil society respond to shifting notions of the workplace, more
international supply chains, and of the increasing levels of economic migration
which appear likely?
Some of the strongest of the drivers of change, and some of the greatest tensions within
the scenario stories, are about the direct and indirect effects of global economics and
global labour markets. These play out in different ways. In none of the scenarios do we see
stronger organisation within the UK workplace, although the increases in manufacturing
elsewhere is likely to see trade union membership grow globally. For the UK and Ireland it
will be the most vulnerable workers that are likely to lack effective trade union organisation.
At the same time, some of the most volatile parts of the scenarios are where migrant
workers – temporary or long-term – come into conflict with existing populations. These
workers are typically the most exposed in the labour market and most likely to find
themselves in exploitative working relationships. Yet there seems to be few substantial
civil society institutions capable of influencing these types of workplace effectively, or of
connecting the politics of the workplace with the rest of society. This is a key area where
labour organisations and other civil society associations may need to form coalitions to
counter the detrimental impacts of globalisation in its current form.
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How does civil society influence the development of technology so it 
supports the development of a ‘good society’ rather than undermines it?
An increase in the pervasiveness of technology is one of the overall contexts in which 
the scenarios unfold, as technology continues to get cheaper and more powerful. This
generates a number of issues. One is about distribution; technology is not distributed evenly
within society, and this seems unlikely to change significantly. If it becomes more influential
as a channel for civil society organisation, there will be people who are simply left out. 
Secondly, most of the networks on which technologies are deployed are commercially
owned, which may, sooner or later, have implications for freedoms of speech or
behaviour, or for access.
And third, technology will continue to increase as a tool for monitoring, surveillance, and
population control, which may also limit the freedom of action of civil society activists. 
Yet technology has also been an area which has seen some of the most innovative civil
society projects of the last decade, whether in the form of open source software, the
Creative Commons initiative, or the free wireless movement. What can civil society
organisations do to reinforce the use of technology in a way which supports civil society
rather than undermines it? 
What are the coming problems which can only be addressed by civil society
associations – and what is the nature of these problems which make this true?  
It is easy for civil society to think of itself as the answer to everything. But it is at its most
effective when it has a clear identity and a clear purpose. Civil society associations sit
both outside of the market and the government, and also between them. In the coming
decades, which problems will be uniquely addressable by organisations which have that
independence from the market and from government?   
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What now?
The status quo is not an option. 
Looking back, in one generation alone we have seen significant changes in international
relations, the global economy, communications technology and the rise in the number
and voice of civil society associations throughout the world.
Looking forward, this report has illustrated that there are many forces that will change 
the future nature and role of civil society, for good or ill. Clearly, there is not one future, 
but multiple possible futures, dependent partly on how we choose to respond to or 
create change. 
The Inquiry sought to explore the possible threats to and opportunities for civil society 
in the UK and Ireland, looking out to 2025. By applying futures thinking and gathering
insights from over 400 people, this report and the complementary scenarios report has
heightened our understanding of what the future might hold. 
The challenge now is how best to focus energies so that threats are diminished and
opportunities are taken advantage of. Given the scale and scope of the challenges 
ahead, much action may need to be collective in nature, bridging diverse civil society
associations. 
For the Inquiry, drawing on the findings of the futures work, this will
involve identifying a number of ‘burning issues’ that are critical to 
the future health of civil society. The Inquiry will focus its energy on
exploring how policy and practice might be enhanced in relation to 
the identified burning issues during 2008.
For civil society associations more widely, we hope that the Inquiry’s
futures reports and the accompanying toolkit on how to use scenarios
(available on the Inquiry website) will stimulate further deliberation 
about how civil society associations might better prepare for and 
shape the future. 
“Futurism is the art of reperception.
It means recognising that life will
change, must change, and has
changed, and it suggests how
and why. It shows that old
perceptions have lost their validity,
while new ones are possible.”
Bruce Sterling, Science Fiction Writer
What now?
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This report concentrates on the scenario building and testing work that was undertaken
at the Inquiry scenarios and implications workshops (illustrated in Figure 2).
Figure 2: Stages of the futures events for the Inquiry 
Source: Henley Centre HeadlightVision
To build the scenarios Henley Centre HeadlightVision applied a technique called Causal
Layered Analysis (CLA). CLA was developed by the futurist Sohail Inayatullah to help think
about circumstances in which values and underlying metaphors are a significant part of
possible social change.6 It is based on the assumption that the way in which one frames 
a problem changes the policy solution and the actors responsible for creating change.
CLA exploration of the future by thinking about it as a number of different levels, 
illustrated in Figure 3 (overleaf) and outlined below:
1 The first level is the ‘litany’ – quantitative trends, problems, often exaggerated,
sometimes used for political purposes – usually presented by the news media. In 
litany, events, issues and trends are not connected and appear discontinuous. The
result can be helplessness, apathy, or projected action (‘why don’t they do something
about it?’). This is the futurist as fearmonger who warns: ‘the end is near’. Equally, by
believing in the prophecy and acting appropriately, the end can be averted.
2 The second level is concerned with social causes, including economic, cultural,
political and historical factors. Interpretation is given to quantitative data. This type 
of analysis is frequently articulated by policy institutes. Scenarios projects sometimes
concentrate largely on this layer. Underlying relationships are sometimes analysed (for
example, population growth is linked to advances in medicine/health). The role of the
state and other actors and interests is often explored at this level.
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3 The third deeper level is concerned with structure and the discourse, or ‘worldview’
that supports and legitimates it. Discerning deeper assumptions behind the issue is
crucial here as are efforts to reframe or revise one’s understanding of the presented
problem or issue. At this stage, one can explore how different discourses (for example,
the economic, the social, the cultural) do not just cause the issue but help to constitute
it. From understanding the prevailing worldviews, discrete alternative scenarios can 
be derived here. 
4 The fourth layer of analysis is at the level of metaphor or myth. These are the deep
stories, the collective archetypes, the unconscious dimensions of the problem or the
paradox (e.g. seeing population as non-statistical, as community, or seeing people 
as creative resources). This level provides a response at an emotional level to the
worldview under inquiry, and the language used is more concerned with evoking 
visual images, with touching the heart instead of reading the head.
Figure 3: The building blocks of causal layered analysis 
Source: Sohail Inayatullah
Participants in the Inquiry scenarios workshops were asked to work down the building
blocks from litany to worldview, before proposing alternative future worldviews and 
then working back up through future causes and systems to future litanies. By exploring
different metaphors or different worldviews, and then working back through the layers,
participants reframe the future and identify alternative outcomes. 
It follows that the scenarios which are developed are deductive in nature, rather than
inductive. In this respect, for example, the process is unlike the conventional ‘matrix-
based’ approach popularised by Global Business Network, where the scenarios are
derived from pairs of significant uncertainties. 
If aspects of the scenarios seem challenging, it is worth recalling the remark by the
Hawaiian futurist Jim Dator that “Any useful idea about the future should appear to 
be ridiculous.”7 It is worth reminding ourselves that there are no future facts. 
Litany
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List of Inquiry scenarios/implications workshop
participants 
The Carnegie UK Trust and the Inquiry Commission are grateful to all who contributed 
to the Inquiry’s futures work. Please note that all informants were asked to contribute 
as individuals and not as representatives of any organisation. 
Name                                 Primary affiliation 
Edward Andersson Involve
Richard Atkinson* Church of England
Ian Barcroft Faith in Community Scotland
Carole Bell Meadow Well Connected
Elaine Bradley Volunteering Ireland
Jackie Butler Common Purpose Ireland
Ilona Buchroth University of Sunderland
Fiona Campbell Voluntary Arts Scotland
Sarah Campbell  Scottish Executive
Paula Carey National Economic and Social Council
Helen Chambers Lloyds TSB Foundation for Scotland
Tom Costello Atlantic Philanthropies
Mary Coyle Aspire
Karl Cunion Department of Trade and Industry
David Cutler Baring Foundation
Vera Dakova Mott Foundation
Philomena de Lima* University of the Highlands and Islands
Sarah del Tufo The Evaluation Trust
Malcolm Dean The Guardian
Pat Devlin Pendower Good Neighbour Project
Paul Devlin Voluntary Arts England
Pauline Dodgson Consultant
James Doorley* National Youth Council Ireland
Hugh Donnelly Co-operative Development Scotland
Alison Elliott Church of Scotland
David Emerson Association of Charitable Foundations
Hannah Eyres Keyfund Federation
Honor Fagan National University of Ireland
Geraldine Fennell Care Alliance Ireland
Georgina Fletcher Regional Refugee Forum North East
Patrick Ford University of Dundee
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David Francis Community Action Northumberland
Colin Fraser Jubilee Scotland
Faye Gatenby Capability Scotland
Pat Gates Dublin Inner City Partnership
Megan Griffith National Council for Voluntary Organisations
Non Gwilym Strata Matrix
Lucy Hooberman BBC
Mbemba Jabbi Africa Centre
Declan Jones Herriot Watt University
Rajiv Joshi Scottish Youth Parliament
Joe Kamanga African Community Advice North East  
Tony Kendle Eden Project
Ian Leggett People and Planet
Stephen Maxwell Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations 
John-Mark McCafferty St Vincent de Paul
Maura McCullen De Paul Trust
Louise McDonald Young Scot
Siobhán McGee Trinity College Dublin
Yvonne McKenna Volunteer Centres Ireland
Claire McMaster Sheila McKechnie Foundation 
Marjo Moonen Tallaght Partnership Ltd
Geoff Mulgan* Young Foundation
Ronnie Munck Dublin City University
Colin Murphy Glencree Centre for Peace and Reconciliation
Fidele Mutwarasibo Immigrant Council of Ireland
Mohamed Nasreldin North of England Refugee Service
Marie Navarro Cardiff Law School
Anna Nicholl* Welsh Refugee Council
Graeme Oram Five Lamps Organisation
Eoin O’Mahony Irish Bishops' Conference
Alex O'Neil Joseph Rowntree Foundation
John Osmond Institute of Welsh Affairs
Simon Parker Demos
Tanveer Parnez Black and Ethnic Minorities in Scotland
Sarah Pearson Hanover Communications
Tony Pender Carnegie UK Trust (Trustee)
Hannah Perrin The Wheel
Cathy Pharoah Third Sector Prospect
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David Porter Contemporary Christianity
Patricia Quinn GuideStar Ireland
Robert Rae Scottish Futures Forum
Judith Robertson Oxfam Scotland
Gill Scott Scottish Poverty Information Unit
Ruchir Shah SCVO 
John Shaw Department of the Taoiseach
Wendy Shepherd Barnardos
Maureen Sier Scottish Interfaith Council
Frauke Sinclair Scottish Council Foundation
Peter Singleton Scottish Environmental Protection Agency
Matthew Smerden Baring Foundation
Rebecca Stafford Wales Council for Voluntary Action
Sue Stirling ippr north
Sarah Stone Age Concern Cymru
Jane Streather Social Policy advisor
Robin Tennant Poverty Alliance
Helen Tyrell Voluntary Health Scotland
Áine Uí Ghiollagáin Cúram
Tom Wakeford Policy, Ethics and Life Sciences Research Centre
Barbara Walshe Combat Poverty
Kate Welch Acumen Community Development Trust
Karl Wilding National Council for Voluntary Organisations
Rob Williamson    Northern Rock
Jonathan Wright Scottish Executive – Social Inclusion
Carol Young Scottish Low Pay Unit




Geoff Mulgan (Chair), Director, Young Foundation
George Reid (Vice-Chair), former Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament
Fareena Alam, Editor of Q News
Richard Atkinson, Archdeacon of Leicester
Millie Banerjee (ex-officio), Board member of Ofcom
Kay Carberry, Secretary of the Trade Union Congress
Rajeeb Dey, Founder and Chairman of the English Secondary Students’ Association
James Doorley, Director of the National Youth Council of Ireland
Daniel Finkelstein, Columnist and Comment Editor of The Times newspaper
Philomena de Lima, Development Officer and Researcher with University of Highlands
and Islands
Seamus McAleavey, Chief Executive of the Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action
Charlie McConnell (ex-officio), Chief Executive, Carnegie UK Trust 
Joyce McMillan, Chief theatre critic for The Scotsman newspaper
Anna Nicholl, Policy and Campaigns Coordinator at the All Wales Refugee Council
Maeve Sherlock, Student of Theology, Durham University and former Chief Executive of
the Refugee Council 
Neil Sherlock, Partner in charge of public and regulatory affairs at KPMG
Jane Steele, Head of Research and Evidence at the General Teaching Council for England
Ed Vaizey, Member of Parliament for Wantage and Didcot
International Advisory Group
Halima Begum – Education Adviser, Department for International Development 
Tom Carothers – Vice President for Studies, International Politics and Politics, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Michael Edwards – Director of the Governance and Civil Society Program, Ford Foundation 
John Gaventa – Professor and Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies
Shannon Lawder – Regional Director, Civil Society Programme for Central/Eastern 
Europe and Russia, C.S. Mott Foundation  
Kumi Naidoo – Secretary General and Chief Executive Officer, CIVICUS: World Alliance 
for Citizen Participation
Gerry Salole – Chief Executive, European Foundation Centre
Carnegie UK Trust Inquiry Staff
Lenka Setkova, Director, Democracy and Civil Society Programme
Erin van der Maas, Research Analyst
Morven Masterton, Programme Coordinator
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1 The tool-kit guide is available on-line at http://democracy.carnegieuktrust.org.uk/
civil_society/publications. 
2 Michael Edwards (2004) Civil Society. Cambridge, Polity.
3 DEFRA, “Looking back at looking forwards”, (2007), http://horizonscanning.defra.gov.uk/
ViewDocument_Image.aspx?Doc_ID=192
4 Peter Schwarz, quoted in Blake Harris, “Scenarios of Prosperity and the Long Boom”,
September 2001, Government Technology, www.govtech.net
5 http://creativecommons.org.uk/
6 Sohail Inayatullah (ed), (2004), The Causal Layered Analysis Reader. Taipei, Tamkung
University Press.
7 Jim Dator, “Dator's "Laws" of the Futures (and of Futures Studies)”, available at
www.futures.hawaii.edu/2006/06/jamais-12-jims-7.php [accessed 16 August 2007].
“While some of the future is contained in the present (and/or the past) and thus "known"
(and/or "knowable") to everyone in the present, much of the future is novel and not
currently or previously experienced. When these unprecedented aspects of the future 
are presented to people, they often react in shock and disbelief because of their
unfamiliarity”. 
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